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Promoting patient safety is a national priority. To evaluate interventions for reducing medical errors and adverse event, eﬀective
methods for detecting such events are required. This paper reviews the current methodologies for detection of adverse events and
discusses their relative advantages and limitations. It also presents a cognitive framework for error monitoring and detection. While
manual chart review has been considered the ‘‘gold-standard’’ for identifying adverse events in many patient safety studies, this
methodology is expensive and imperfect. Investigators have developed or are currently evaluating, several electronic methods that
can detect adverse events using coded data, free-text clinical narratives, or a combination of techniques. Advances in these systems
will greatly facilitate our ability to monitor adverse events and promote patient safety research. But these systems will perform
optimally only if we improve our understanding of the fundamental nature of errors and the ways in which the human mind can
naturally, but erroneously, contribute to the problems that we observe.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Adverse events in health care appear to be responsi-
ble for 44,000 to 98,000 accidental deaths and over one
million excess injuries each year [1,2]. Estimates of the
prevalence of adverse events per hospital admission
range from 2.9 to 16.6% [3–6]. While medical errors
have not been as extensively studied in the outpatient
setting, it is estimated that 3–35% of outpatients expe-
rience an adverse drug event [7–10] and that 13% of all
adverse events identiﬁed during hospitalizations occur
during outpatient care [3]. In one study from a tertiary
care center, 19% of patients discharges from the hos-
pital experienced an adverse event during the transition
to outpatient care [11]. The pervasive problem of med-* Corresponding author. Fax: 1-615-327-5381.
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doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2003.08.003ical errors and adverse events in healthcare has made
improving patient safety a national priority [12].
High quality evidence exists supporting many inter-
ventions designed to improve patient safety [13], yet
much work still remains. Researchers wishing to evalu-
ate the eﬀectiveness of patient safety interventions are
faced with a daunting challenge. Identiﬁcation of ad-
verse events is critical for improving patient safety, yet
medical errors and adverse events can be challenging to
measure [14]. Eﬀorts to overcome these problems have
resulted in the development of several tools that re-
searchers and increasingly clinical teams are using to
detect adverse events.
This paper reviews the methodologies that have been
utilized for adverse event detection. For the purpose of
this review, we have also included methods used to in-
crease the reporting of adverse events within our deﬁ-
nition of adverse event detection systems, as well as
132 H.J. Murﬀ et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 36 (2003) 131–143more recent approaches to the application of cognitive
science principles to understanding and monitoring er-
rors. We will begin with a brief description of both
voluntary and involuntary manual methods for adverse
event detection, then review combined modalities in-
volving both electronic screening and manual review,
and then describe fully automated methods for adverse
event detection. We discuss the cognitive perspective in
the ﬁnal section.
No universal deﬁnitions for descriptive terminology
used within patient safety literature currently exist. This
is one of the factors resulting in varying estimates of the
prevalence of adverse events and medical errors. For the
purposes of this paper, we will use the deﬁnitions pre-
sented by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to deﬁne
adverse events and medical errors. The IOM deﬁned an
adverse event as ‘‘an injury caused by medical man-
agement rather than the underlying condition of the
patient’’ and a medical error as ‘‘the failure of a planned
action to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong
plan to achieve an aim’’ [1]. A preventable adverse event
is an adverse event that results from an error. It is im-
portant to note is that most adverse events do not result
from an error, an example being a patient who experi-
ences an anaphylactic reaction after their ﬁrst exposure
to a drug to which they had no prior allergic history,
and also that most errors do not result in an adverse
event, for example a ten-fold overdose order for a drug
that gets intercepted and corrected by a pharmacist.
Medical errors occur much more frequently than ad-
verse events and medication errors outnumber adverse
drug events by 100–1 [15].2. Manual methods
2.1. Voluntary reporting methods
2.1.1. Incident reporting
A cornerstone of safety initiatives in other industries
has been the reporting and analysis of errors [16]. The
commercial aviation industry has been a pioneer in this
area designing non-punitive, blame-free reporting sys-
tems [17,18]. Other industries, such as nuclear power
[16], have also follow this lead and established reporting
systems, yet despite the successes of voluntary error re-
porting systems in other industries, voluntary reporting
or incident reports in healthcare has been relatively
unsuccessful. By incident reporting, we speciﬁcally mean
the voluntary reporting of a medical event by a health
care provider. Incident reports have traditionally been
paper-based forms, however some online reporting sys-
tems exist [19]. Studies that have compared the rate of
adverse event detection through incident reports to
those detected by chart review have found that only
1.5% of adverse events [20] and only 6% of adverse drugevents [21] are detected through incident reports.
Nonetheless, incident reports still remain the mechanism
that most institutions use to detect adverse events.
There are several important reasons why incident
reporting in its current state may not be the most ef-
fective way to detect adverse events [22,23], including
interruption in workﬂow, perception that completing a
form will not result any improvement, lack of knowl-
edge that an adverse event had occurred, and fear of
exposing oneself to litigation [23–26]. Incident reports
remain an attractive source of information because they
are generally readily available, it is often possible to
obtain detailed descriptions of what went wrong, truly
catastrophic errors or events can sometimes be found
which can be used to make changes, and they represent
the best source of potential adverse events, or near
misses [27]. However, problems with underreporting
greatly limit their utility for patient safety research.
2.1.2. Prompted spontaneous reporting
Some investigators have attempted to increase vol-
untary reporting through continuously prompting phy-
sicians, nurses, or pharmacists to report errors or
adverse events. In one study, medical residents were sent
daily electronic mail reminder reminding them to report
adverse events [20]. Along with the daily prompts, once
weekly all medical residents were again asked to report
adverse events. Adverse events were reported through
either electronic mail or paper reports. Over the four-
month study period the residents reported 89 adverse
events while 85 were detected by chart review. Notably,
only 41 of the adverse events were identiﬁed by both of
the methodologies, although all the adverse events ap-
peared real, suggesting that the true underlying rate is
higher than that identiﬁed by any single methodology.
Welsh et al. [28] studied how the intensity of
prompted reporting might inﬂuence reporting rates.
Medical residents who were prompted on a daily basis
tended to report more adverse events per month (55 4)
when compared to those prompted weekly (24 15) or
those not prompted at all (21 2). Furthermore, the
number of housestaﬀ reporting adverse events increased
as the intensity of prompting increased (no prompt-
ing¼ 0.55 0.3, low-level prompting¼ 1.47 0.3, in-
tensive-level prompting¼ 4.04 0.4, p < 0:001). Similar
to prior studies, the degree of overlap between events
reported by the residents and those detected through
incident reporting was small.
Another study created a voluntary reporting system
in which residents detected adverse events by interviews
with their peers and detected 88 adverse events over a 3-
month period [29]. This study, as prior studies of
prompted physician report, has several limitations. The
intervention was only studied over a short period of
time, and it is unclear if because of the high level of
eﬀort required maintaining these systems they could be
Table 1
Screening Criteria for Adverse Events in Chart Reviewa
Screening Criteria
Hospitalization within previous year for patients less than 65
years old
Admission to any hospital after this discharge
Previous failure of medical management or unfavorable results
Trauma incurred in hospital
Unfavorable drug reaction in hospital
Transfer from general care to special care unit
Transfer to another acute care hospital
Return to operating room during hospitalization
Treatment for organ damage after invasive procedure
Acute myocardial infarction, cerebrovascular accident, or
pulmonary embolus during or after an invasive procedure
Neurologic deﬁcit at discharge
Death
Temperature higher than 38.3 C on day before or day of
discharge
Cardiac or respiratory arrest
Five-minute Apgar score <6, or complication of abortion or
labor and delivery
Other undesirable outcome
Indication of litigation in the medical record
Length of hospital stay above 90th percentile for the diagnosis-
related group in patient under 70, and 95th percentiles in those
70 or older
aCriteria from the Harvard Medical Practice Study [30].
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medical residents only. Not only might prompted phy-
sician reporting not improve adverse event detection
rates for hospitals without residents, but also these
methods might not even be eﬀective for non-medical
housestaﬀ, such as surgical or obstetric residents.
Stimulated voluntary reporting has also been used
with nurses and pharmacists [15,27]. In these studies,
nurses and pharmacists were asked on each shift whe-
ther they had noted anything that might represent an
adverse drug event or potential adverse drug event.
Overall, this approach was much more eﬀective for
identifying near misses than adverse events.
2.1.3. Conclusions regarding reporting
Spontaneous reporting has identiﬁed a number of
clusters of important problems that have resulted in
important policy change, including deaths related to
concentrated potassium, concentrated lidocaine, and
deaths and disability related to confusion between cis-
platinum and carboplatinum. However, such events are
fortunately rare, and utilizing them best requires ag-
gregating them at the regional or national level. At the
local level, identiﬁcation of a single event can sometimes
reveal a suﬃciently important problem that it makes
sense to change a process or system, though this is un-
usual.
Although voluntary reporting can detect a broad
range of adverse events, these systems miss the vast
majority of events and cannot provide stable estimates
of the true underlying defect rates, which has resulted in
the development and evaluation of other detection
methods that do not rely on spontaneous reporting. In
this next section, we review several manual adverse event
detection systems that do not require active participa-
tion including chart review, direct observation, and di-
rect patient interviews.
2.2. Involuntary reporting methods
2.2.1. Chart review
Most of the epidemiological evidence describing ad-
verse medical events comes from several large studies
that used chart reviews to detect adverse events. The
California Medical Insurance Feasibility Study, the
Harvard Medical Practice Study, and the Colorado-
Utah Study all described similar methodologies to detect
adverse events [4,5,30]. Charts underwent a two-phase
screening process. Initially a trained reviewer, usually a
research nurse, examined charts for 18 screening criteria.
(Table 1) Charts with one of these screening criteria then
underwent physician review. Physician reviewers made
judgments on whether they believed an adverse event
had occurred based on the information contained within
the chart. Reviewers then rated their conﬁdence that the
patients medical management resulted in the injury.When a physician reviewer was more than 50% conﬁ-
dent that medical management resulted in the injury, an
adverse event was considered to have occurred. Typi-
cally, either all or a fraction of the charts are reviewed
independently by two physicians. If the physician re-
viewers disagree on whether an adverse event occurred,
the physicians will try to come to a consensus or involve
a third party.
While this two-step chart review process has been
used to provide much of the adverse event prevalence
data, several problems exist with this methodology.
First, the positive predictive value of the initial screening
process was low (21%) [31] resulting in the physician
reviewers evaluating a high number of false-positive
charts. Second, agreement between physicians is gener-
ally poor with respect to causality. In one observational
study, the number of cases in which there was ‘‘extreme
disagreement’’ as to whether an adverse event occurred
actually outnumbered the cases in which the physician
agreed [32]. While the j-statistic for the physician
agreement concerning an adverse event occurrence in
the Harvard Medical Practice Study was moderate
(j ¼ 0:61) [3], other investigators have found lower rates
of agreements (j ¼ 0:40, 95% conﬁdence interval [CI]
0.30–0.51) [33] and have questioned this overall meth-
odology [34]. But perhaps the greatest limitation to this
methodology to detect adverse events is the overall re-
sources required, which are great when compared to
other screening modalities [21]. Some investigators have
used fewer screening criteria to help reduce the overall
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chart review remains an impractical means for routine
adverse event detection because of the high costs.
2.2.2. Observers
Another method used to detect adverse events has
been the use of trained observers. This approach has
advantages over chart review in that is can be performed
prospectively. Observers have been used to detect ad-
verse events in the intensive care unit [36] and surgical
care ﬂoors [37]. In one study, observers were trained in
how to recognize adverse events and recorded physi-
cians comments made during patient care activities [37].
These observers were able to detect serious adverse
events in 17.7% of all patients studied.
Medication errors, deﬁned as any error occurring
during the ordering, transcribing, dispensing, adminis-
tering, and monitoring of medications, are common
occurrences that sometimes result in patient injury [15].
In a study that compared direct observation, chart re-
view, and incident reports to determine the most eﬀec-
tive means for detecting medication errors, direct
observation detected 300 errors made on 2556 doses
compared with only 17 errors detected on the same
doses detected by chart review [38]. Several investigators
have described direct observation as the most sensitive
detection method for identifying medication errors [39].
A limitation of direct observation is that it can be an
expensive method for error detection with a mean cost
of $4.82 per error detected versus $0.63 per error de-
tected by chart review [38]. Furthermore, even though
more errors are detected, the errors tend to be less likely
to result in an injury than errors detected through other
methodologies [14].
2.2.3. Patient interviews
Much of the data concerning adverse events in the
hospital setting has come from chart reviews. How-
ever, it has been more challenging to detect adverse
events that occur in the outpatient setting using this
methodology. Outpatient charts are generally less data
intense than inpatient charts with patient visits occur-
ring sporadically. As a result, many researchers have
relied on patient interviews to detect adverse events in
these settings [9]. Recent survey evidence suggests that
patients can be good source for adverse event detec-
tion. Two recent patient surveys have indicated that
20–42% of patients have experienced and are aware of
an error occurring with their medical care and that the
majority of these errors resulted in serious conse-
quences [40,41].
A recent study by Forster et al. [11], utilized patient
interviews to help construct case summaries for physi-
cian reviewers. Information sources in the preparation
of the case summaries included patient interviews, sign-
out notes, discharge summaries, and laboratory results.Adverse events were determined based on review of
these case-summaries.
Patient interviews oﬀer a novel potential source for
adverse event detection yet, similar to using observers,
require a substantial resource commitment. Nonethe-
less, patient observations concerning their care likely
uncovers adverse events that might not be detectable by
other means and the approach warrants further study.
In summary, manual adverse event and error detec-
tion systems oﬀer the ability to detect a wide array of
adverse events. All of the above systems are limited by
either physician reluctance to use them or the resource
requirements to maintain them, but they can be very
useful in research, and direct observation can be used in
clinical care to detect the medication error rate because
the high rate of errors allows rapid assessment of the
rate [38,39].
To overcome these limitations, several electronic
methods for detecting adverse events have been eval-
uated. Advances in information technology, the in-
crease in hospitals with integrated information
systems, and ambulatory electronic medical records
have increasingly made it possible for institutions to
automatically detect adverse events [42]. Institutions
with computerized event-monitors in place have been
able to detect a greater number of adverse drug events
when compared to spontaneous reporting [21]. Even
more exciting is that some of these methods can detect
errors prior to the occurrence of an adverse event or
before it becomes severe and thus prevent or amelio-
rate patient injury [43]. In the following section we
review detection methods that combine automated
techniques with manual review followed by fully au-
tomated systems.3. Combined modalities
Combined modalities are methods for detecting ad-
verse events that rely on both electronic and manual
review process. In general, these systems identify an
electronically stored ‘‘signal,’’ such as a laboratory ab-
normality, use of a medication along with development
of a symptom, as screening criteria to identify charts for
further review. These systems generally require less re-
viewer time and thus are less expensive to operate than
manual systems. However, as a result of low speciﬁcity,
much of these approaches still require some form of
manual review. A few of these screening methods have
evolved into stand-alone systems that no longer require
any form of manual review. We begin with a review of
adverse event detection systems that utilize a single data
source, such as administrative data, as a signal, followed
by more sophisticated systems that use multiple data
sources, such as pharmacy and laboratory databases,
and rule-based alert logic to detect adverse events.
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3.1.1. Single data source
As discussed above, chart reviews have relied on a
two-step process, which initially involves a screening
review followed by physician review. However, many of
the criteria used for the initial screening process could be
electronically captured. Several investigators have eval-
uated the test characteristics of generic screens obtain-
able through administrative or billing data. In one
study, ﬁve generic screens were used to attempt to screen
for adverse events. Overall these ﬁve triggers had a po-
sitive predictive value of 20% and were able to detect
50% of all AE occurring in the cohort [44]. Removing a
poorly performing billing screen resulted in an overall
improvement in the positive predictive value (30%) but
detected only about half as many AEs as the ﬁrst
method. Other investigators have had similar results
with positive predictive values of the generic screens
ranging from 12 to 34% [45]. Despite these low positive
predictive values, strategies for adverse event detection
that incorporate these electronically captured generic
screens do cost signiﬁcantly less per adverse event de-
tected [44] making them an attractive alternative to pure
manual review. The Veterans Aﬀairs Hospital has de-
veloped an occurrence-screening program that utilizes
similar electronically captured generic screens to search
for events that might require further peer review [46].
Iezzoni developed a computer algorithm called the
Complications Screening Program (CSP), which sear-
ched discharge abstracts for potential complications,
using ICD-9-CM codes as a signal [47,48]. For surgical
event screens, 73% were corroborated on chart review.
However, only 32% corroborated for the medical event
screens [49]. The major reason for the poor performance
of the medical event screens resulted from the tools
inability to distinguish diagnoses that were present on
admission from those that occurred during the hospi-
talization. Of the screens detected for the medical cases,
58% were present on hospital admission as opposed to
only 13% in the surgical patients. As a result of these
ﬁndings the authors did not advise using the tool as a
‘‘stand-alone’’ test for detecting most complications,
though it still may be useful with follow-up review.
Regardless, ICD-9-CM codes have been utilized to de-
tect medical adverse events in recent publications [50],
and are used by many commercial organizations to de-
tect complications [51,52]. ICD-9-CM codes have also
been used to detecting adverse events in outpatient care,
but identiﬁed only a small number of events, in part
because adverse event codes were rarely used in this
setting [53].
There are several limitations to using ICD-9-CM
codes as a search strategy. First ICD-9-CM codes are
generated for reimbursement purposes rather than
clinical care and may not be appropriate for clinicalstudies [54]. Second, ICD-9-CM codes frequently are
erroneously assigned. In one study designed to deter-
mine whether clinical evidence could be found within the
chart to support the ICD-9-CM codes found in the
discharge abstract, only 70% of medical patient and 81%
of surgical patients had objective evidence to support
the code within their record [55]. Finally, as mentioned
above, ICD-9-CM codes do not discriminate between
pre-existing and newly documented diagnoses.
One possibility means for overcoming the limitations
of using ICD-9-CM coding to detect possible adverse
events is to use clinical narratives as a data source.
Clinical narratives contain rich information yet the un-
coded nature of this data has made it challenging to
develop detection systems. Methods have been devel-
oped for both inpatient and outpatient clinical narra-
tives.
Initial approaches to detect adverse events within
inpatient clinical narrative have focused on discharge
summaries. In one study, simple keyword searches were
used to screen for adverse events [56]. Discharge sum-
maries were parsed into individual words and queried
for ‘‘trigger words’’ that represented adverse event
concepts. An example of a ‘‘trigger word’’ was agitation.
Of the 424 selected discharge summaries for screening, 3
contained the ‘‘trigger word’’ agitation and all three had
an adverse event revealed on chart review. A total of 95
trigger words were included. Overall, the electronic tool
had a positive predictive value of 52% (95% CI 46–58%)
but had poor speciﬁcity (48%, 95% CI 42–54%). Speci-
ﬁcity could have been markedly improved by adding a
manual discharge summary review step to the screening
process. However, the addition of this step would oﬀset
some of the time gains made through electronic
screening. Addressing the negation terms and lexical
variants that resulted from keyword queries could
eliminate some false positives, however to make sub-
stantial improvements in the tool, more sophisticated
searching techniques, such as natural language pro-
cessing, would be required [57].
3.1.2. Integrated data source
Using an electronic medical record, Honigman et al.
[53] developed a tool that searched a patients adminis-
trative data, medication history, and clinical narrative
from the visit note to identify adverse drug events. The
tool initially parsed the visit note into words and word
combinations. These terms were then ﬁltered through a
medical dictionary database and joined into master
concepts, which could be indicative of an adverse drug
event. Drugs and drug classes were then linked to the
reported adverse drug events. For example, if the term
diarrhea was mentioned within the clinical narrative,
this term was joined to the adverse drug event concept of
‘‘diarrhea’’ and linked to any medication the patient
might be taking that could cause diarrhea, such as
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methods (ICD-9-CM screening, allergy screening, event
monitor, and text searching) the overall positive pre-
dictive value of this process was low (7.2%, 95% CI 6.8–
7.5), but this methodology was estimated to have de-
tected 91% of all adverse drug events recorded in the
chart [53].
Using clinical narrative to detect adverse events has
great potential as a screening tool. Advances in the
searching algorithms and the use of natural language
processors should greatly improve the test characteris-
tics. Natural language processors extract concepts from
free text narrative through using basic grammatical rules
and knowledge about the domain [58–60]. A range of
natural language processing technologies exists. Some
processors cover a broad range of medicine and produce
comprehensive coded output [60]. To detect medical
events, one applies queries or rules to the output to ﬁnd
cases with relevant evidence. If patient safety terms are
missing from the processors lexicon, it will be necessary
to add them. Some natural language processors are de-
signed to detect speciﬁc concepts. In this case, it is
necessary to modify the processor itself (e.g., modify a
Bayesian network [61]). Natural language processors
have achieved classiﬁcation rates similar to that of ex-
pected manual reviewers, with receiver operating char-
acteristic curve areas of 0.95–0.96 [58,61,62]. These
natural language processors outperformed keyword
searches even when negation was explicitly handled
[58,61]. There is therefore enthusiasm that natural lan-
guage processing may replace costly manual review of
discharge summaries, operative notes, nursing notes,
daily progress notes, and visit notes for detecting ad-
verse events. Unfortunately, as of this writing, natural
language processors are not broadly available, and it
will take some time for commercial products to reach
the performance of research systems.
3.2. Nosocomial infection detection systems
Several groups have successfully developed nosoco-
mial infection event monitors [63]. When compared to
manual review, computerized surveillance has superior
sensitivity and required less person time [64]. These
systems typical work by searching clinical databases for
signals and then generating an alert for hospital infec-
tion control personnel.
3.2.1. Single data source
Most described nosocomial infection detection sys-
tems have utilized multiple data sources and a rule-base
to generate alerts. Dessau et al. [65] have described a
system that relies solely on laboratory data. This sur-
veillance system detects changes in the incidences of
microorganisms identiﬁed within the hospital laboratory
databases. Isolated microorganisms identiﬁed over aweekly period are compared to isolation rates detected
during a preceding period. Detection limits are deter-
mined based on the distribution of the diﬀerences be-
tween the expected event count and the observed event
count. The authors note several nosocomial infectious
outbreaks identiﬁed by this system. While this system
appears successful at identifying nosocomial outbreaks,
it would only be able to capture a small subset of all
nosocomial infections.
3.2.2. Integrated data source
More often, nosocomial infection detection systems
have relied on data from several sources. One approach
has combined laboratory (microbiology) data and ad-
ministrative data to generate alerts regarding possible
nosocomial infections [66,67]. Hirschhorn et al. [66]
developed a computer program that captured the du-
ration and timing of antibiotic exposure and the ICD-9-
CM coded discharge diagnosis to detect nosocomial
infections occurring after non-elective cesarean sections.
Alerts generated when an individual had a discharge
diagnosis code suggestive of infection and duration of
antibiotic exposure greater than expected for prophy-
laxis purposes had a high positive predictive value for
detecting a nosocomial infection (94%) but a poor sen-
sitivity (59%). Major limitations of this detection system
resulted from inaccuracies in the diagnostic codes, with
35% of the infections not being identiﬁed by ICD-9-CM
codes.
Other nosocomial infection surveillance systems have
relied on a combination of microbiology data and an
extensively developed rule-based expert system [63,68].
These systems typically search for positive culture re-
ports from microbiology reports. Based on information
obtained from the culture report, the computers acti-
vates speciﬁc modules of its knowledge base to extract
other information, such as admission dates and dates of
recent hospitalizations, from the patients electronic
medical record. This information is used to generate a
daily report for hospital infection control personnel.
These systems have been developed to be both ‘‘data
driven,’’ initiating the logic module anytime an alert
signal in entered into the system, or ‘‘time driven,’’ ini-
tiating the logic module at a set time each day. Noso-
comial infection surveillance systems coupled with
decision support and electronic order entry can decrease
inappropriate antibiotic utilization and reduce hospital
expenditures [64,69].
3.3. Adverse drug event monitors
Several methods exist for the detection of adverse
drug events. Much data has been collected through
prompting nurses and pharmacists to report events,
manual chart reviews [15,38,70,71] and direct observa-
tion [72]. However, because pharmacy and laboratory
Table 2
Examples of signals used for adverse drug event screening
Signal Example
Non-rule based
Laboratory data Bilirubin >1.5 mg/dL
Serum creatinine rise >30% from initial
value
Increased plasma levels of aminoglycoside
Pharmacy data Any order for naloxone
Any order for diphenhydramine
Rule-based
Pharmacy and
Laboratory
Receiving ‘‘nephrotoxin’’ AND blood
creatinine has risen >0.3 mg/dL in last
1 day
On ranitidine and platelet count >100,000
and <250,000/mm3
Pharmacy and
EMRa Orders
Receiving diphenhydramine AND no
diphenhydramine within last 7 days AND
patient no on paclitaxel AND no blood
transfusion in last 1 day
a EMR, electronic medical record.
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drug events are particularly suitable for detection
through electronic surveillance [74]. In this section, we
will describe adverse drug event monitors. These are
tools that can either search a single data source, such as
pharmacy records for an antidote order, or search a
combination of data sources and utilize a rule-base to
detect adverse drug events.
3.3.1. Single data source
Computerized adverse drug event monitors have used
a variety of signals to detect adverse drug events. Signals
include drug orders [75,76], laboratory abnormalities
[77–79], and billing codes [80] (Table 2). Generally pre-
deﬁned criteria are speciﬁed, such as a platelet count of
less than 70,000/lL, and once this threshold has been
reached, an alert is generated for a clinical pharmacist to
review. The major limitation to these systems has been
numerous false positives. False positive rates for some of
these single data source detection systems have ranged
from 77 to 96% [75,77–80]. To reduce this rate of false
positives, event monitors have been designed that in-
corporate multiple data sources and screening algo-
rithms.
3.3.2. Integrated data source
To increase the overall numbers of adverse drug
events detected, many institutions have searched several
data sources for signals. Some of these systems have
incorporated an alert logic into the searching strategy.
An early example of an event monitor, which utilized
multiple data sources stems from work done at LDS
Hospital in Utah [81]. The event monitor continuously
searched patient records looking for laboratory abnor-
malities, such as eosinophil percent greater than 6 or a
digoxin level greater than 2 ng/dL. The program alsoutilized screening algorithms to detect sudden stop or-
ders, dose reduction orders, or drug antidotes. The event
monitor was able to detect 731 adverse drug events over
an 18-month period [82]. During this same time period
traditional reporting means only detected nine events.
The number of false negative reports generated by this
system was not described.
False positive reports were a problem and through
iterative testing, certain screens that often produced
false-positive alerts were dropped as signals [81]. Fur-
thermore, logic was added to the event monitor to help
further reduce false-positive reports. Rules were added
to the knowledge base that would prevent the event
monitor from generating an alert is patient had elevated
liver function tests and an admission diagnosis reﬂective
of liver disease.
Jha et al. [21], at Brigham and Womens Hospital in
Boston, used similar signals that were used at LDS
Hospital for detection of drug events, and further ex-
panded the rule-base. Rules consisted of Boolean com-
binations of signals detected through medication orders,
laboratory results, and medication orders associated
with changes in laboratory results. To reduce false po-
sitive alerts several rules were conditional on multiple
criteria being met. An example would be if pharmacy
records indicated a patient was taking a nephrotoxic
medication while simultaneously laboratory data indi-
cated the patients serum creatinine had risen. (Table 2)
The event monitor detected 275 adverse drug events
compared to 398 detected through manual chart review
and 23 detected through incident reports. In the ﬁrst 8-
weeks of the study the overall positive predictive value
of the screening tool was 16%. Through removal of
poorly performing screens and the addition on more rule
combinations, this positive predictive value increased to
23%. Over the entire study 83% of the alerts were con-
sidered false positives. Despite this high level of false
positive alerts, the computer strategy required only 11
person hours a week to execute as opposed to 55 person
hours for manual chart review.
Similar event monitors have been implemented in
both community hospitals [83] as well as Veterans Af-
fairs hospitals [84,85]. Raschke et al. [83] developed an
event-monitor which targeted 37 speciﬁc adverse events.
Because this study focused on a pre-deﬁned set of ad-
verse drug events, an extensive alert logic could be de-
veloped. Not surprisingly the number of false positives
alerts in this study were signiﬁcantly less that most prior
studies, with only 47% of alerts being judged as false
positives.
Drug-laboratory rules have also been used to detect
adverse drug events occurring in outpatient care. As
with several inpatient event monitors, Boolean combi-
nations of new medication orders, laboratory results
above or below a certain threshold, and changes in
laboratory values over time were used as the alert logic
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to detect more adverse drug events than using ICD-9-
CM codes or using patient allergy information but
overall had very low positive predictive value of 3%. As
with inpatient monitors, with iterative testing it is likely
that the performance of drug-laboratory rules will im-
prove.4. Automated detection systems
The ‘‘gold standard’’ for the determination of an
adverse event has traditionally been implicit physician
judgment. Implicit judgment is often a requirement be-
cause of the diﬃculty of establishing causality. However,
some types of adverse events, such as some adverse drug
events, might be able to be determined without a reli-
ance on implicit judgment. An example might be toxic
serum levels of digoxin or International Normalized
Ratios (INR) greater than 6 in patients on warfarin.
Thus, it could be possible to design adverse event
monitors that are fully automated and require no
manual review component. In this section we will de-
scribe adverse event monitors that have the potential of
being fully automated.
4.1. Intra-operative monitors
Few automated adverse event monitors have de-
scribed methods to detect intra-operative adverse events.
One such monitor performed a structured query search
of drug, laboratory, and vital sign information included
within an anesthesia database [86]. Data combinations
derived from this database were used to detect ﬁve types
of intra-operative adverse events: hypotension, hyper-
tension, bradycardia, tachycardia, and hypovolemia. An
example of one such rule-combination for bradycardia
would be: heart rate under 50 beats per minute for at
least 5 minutes and administration of a drug to increase
the heart rate within a maximum of 15 minutes follow-
ing the ﬁrst measurement of the event. Based on a ran-
dom review of anesthesia records, all events detected
through the automated means were subsequently iden-
tiﬁed by chart review. While the tool was only designed
to detect a few types of adverse events, the overall ac-
curacy of the tool could allow for the elimination of
manual review.
4.2. Inpatient fall monitors
Hripcsak, Wilcox, and Stetson used natural language
processing of the electronic medical record to detect
inpatient falls [42]. This tool searched all inpatient ra-
diology reports, excluding those performed during the
ﬁrst two days of an admission, and was able to identify
those that had been requested as a result of a fall.The tool was then able to determine in which reports a
fracture had been diagnosed. The fall rates detected
through this fully automated tool were similar to fall
rates reported within the medical literature.5. Cognitive frameworks for monitoring and detecting
adverse events for patient safety research
In light of the growing awareness of the role of hu-
man errors in widely publicized incidents such as airline
accidents and complications of medical procedures,
understanding of the cognitive, social, and information
sciences have become crucial in order to make any sig-
niﬁcant contributions to the study and prevention of
human errors. Medical decision-making is constrained
by human cognitive limitations, as well as socio-cultural
and organizational factors, and errors often arise due to
poor and ﬂawed memory, inexperience and poor train-
ing, as well as faulty reasoning and ambiguous com-
munication. To improve patient safety, technology
should be designed that take into account these limita-
tions. Several industries (e.g., aviation and nuclear
power plants) have been very successful in monitoring
and preventing human errors through the careful design
of user interfaces and use of systems theory. A key issue
with many detection systems is that they may not de-
scribe errors or events in suﬃcient detail to make it
possible to get to the root of the problem, and make
appropriate systems changes, which will often involve
interface design. Many organizations are beginning to
apply traditional engineering methodologies to the study
of patient safety concerns, such as failure mode and
eﬀects analysis (FMEA) and root cause analysis (RCA).
While these approaches have produce some notable
successes [87,88], in general, far too often errors and
adverse events are simply accumulated in healthcare,
and the data are not eﬀectively used.
A recent report from the Institute of Medicine sup-
ports the importance of systems design by suggesting
that most medical errors are related to inadequacies in
process rather to incompetence of health workers, and
that information technology can play a particularly
important role in preventing or minimizing the conse-
quences of such errors [12]. Examples include the com-
puter-based veriﬁcation of dosing information at the
time that a drug regimen is ordered, or improved access
to (and legibility of) pertinent clinical information that
may prevent decision-making errors before they occur.
However, there remain major challenges in the imple-
menting and integrating such facilities into clinical en-
vironments and even technology that is designed to
improve safety could result in unintended errors if im-
properly designed for the user.
Because errors are fundamentally cognitive, a cogni-
tive framework is necessary to identify and specify the
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ways in which cognitive factors play important roles in
medical errors are through the cognitive properties of
interactions between human and technology (user in-
terfaces) and the dynamics of information processing in
distributed cognitive systems involving groups of people
and technology (groupware and distributed cognition).
A cognitive foundation for the system is essential for a
complete and in-depth understanding of medical errors.
Once a cognitive foundation is developed, we can clas-
sify medical errors according to their underlying cogni-
tive mechanisms, which we may be able to automate for
adverse event monitoring and detection.
5.1. Developing a taxonomy of medical errors
Within this cognitive framework, errors are divided
into two major categories: (1) slips or lapses that result
from the incorrect execution of a correct action sequence
and (2) mistakes that result from the correct execution
of an incorrect action sequence [89]. To develop such
cognitive theories, we need to start from the very deﬁ-
nition of error: an error is the outcome of a system that
fails to achieve the intended outcome in a planned se-
quence of mental or physical actions. In other words,
errors are errors of actions. Therefore, a cognitive the-
ory of medical errors is based on a basic theory of hu-
man actions. A cognitive theory of human action most
appropriate for medical errors is the seven-stage action
theory developed by Norman [90,91] and reﬁned by
Zhang and his colleagues [92–94].
One critical step toward reducing medical errors in
particular and human errors in general is a cognitive
taxonomy of errors that can (1) categorize all types of
medical errors along cognitive dimensions, (2) associate
each type of medical errors to a speciﬁc underlying
cognitive mechanism, (3) describe how, explain why,
and even predict when and where a speciﬁc error will
occur, and (4) generate intervention strategies for each
type of error. Based on Reasons [89] deﬁnition of hu-
man errors and Normans cognitive theory of human
action [90,91], a preliminary action-based cognitive
taxonomy of medical errors has been developed that
largely satisﬁes these four criteria [92]. This taxonomy
can categorize all types of errors (slips and mistakes)
according to the stages of the action cycle. The authors
have identiﬁed a set of cognitive mechanisms (sub-
stantial but not exhaustive) that underlie each type of
slip or mistake. This taxonomy can also explain why and
describe how a speciﬁc error occurs. With further de-
velopment and reﬁnement, it may have enough predic-
tive power to help designers and implementers to
anticipate more eﬀectively when and where an error
might occur. Finally, at a high, conceptual level, the
authors have generated guidelines for the development
of cognitive interventions and have proposed a frame-work for the development of medical error reporting
systems that over time can monitor and provide solu-
tions or enhance prevention of the kinds of errors that
are reported—which may require collection of additional
data elements at the time of error or adverse event de-
tection.
5.2. Comprehension of natural language text information
Another major cognitive framework necessary for the
study of medical errors is comprehension and natural
language processing of text information. A narrative
text reﬂects natural prose, which is typically the way to
express ones observations and thoughts. It does not
guarantee, however, that the reader would understand
this information exactly as the author meant it [95,96].
Natural language text understanding has two central
and complementary component processes — production
and interpretation. Both of these can be analyzed in
terms of natural linguistic structures (e.g., syntax),
propositions, concepts and discourse dynamics [97].
Information retrieval from such text has two steps.
First, the user has to search through the text, which is
guided by its internal structure, to select the section that
might contain the relevant information. Second, the user
has to read the content of this section to retrieve the
information needed [98]. Structured text, in contrast, is a
format that has an inherent order to it and is highly
organized.
Patel and colleagues [99,100] point out that process-
ing natural language text requires a distinction between
the text base and situation model. A text base is a
propositional representation of the meaning of the text
itself. The reader generates meaning from the text by
transforming the written information into some se-
mantic form or conceptual message. In similar context,
understanding may be regarded as a process whereby
readers attempt to infer the knowledge structure of a
writer through the text, based on what they already
know. Thus the mental model developed by an indi-
vidual who is reading a text is not limited to the infor-
mation contained in the text itself but is extended to
incorporate the readers prior knowledge. In this sense,
the reader constructs a situation model of the scenario
described in the text. It is, then, from the interaction
between the text-base and the situation model that the
conceptual representation emerges [100]. This represen-
tation varies greatly from reader to reader as prior
knowledge and experiences (i.e., expertise) diﬀer.
One example of such application is the paper by
Sharda and colleagues [101], who applied the theoretical
concepts of variation in format and expertise to a study
of discharge summaries. The doctor-patient interaction
generated patient chart was viewed mostly as the text
base since the chart represents the clinical information
gathered from and provided by the patient. The
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of the physician, reﬂects the representation of biomedi-
cal and clinical information originating from the phy-
sicians experience, and was equated to the situation
model.
In the ﬁeld of comprehension, propositional analysis
is one of the formal cognitive methods for investigating
representation of meaning in memory. Details of the use
of such methods are given in Patel et al. [100], where the
focus is on understanding and the use clinical practice
guidelines. Propositional analysis provides the means to
identify concepts and relation among these concepts,
generating network structures at various levels of gran-
ularity. Text-based and situation-based structures to
evaluate the level of understanding can be identiﬁed
through these networks.
The recall and the generation of inferences in reading
a text can be coded and is linked to the understand-
ability and the coherence of a text [99]. The amount of
prior knowledge (expertise) in reading a text is also re-
lated to the process of inference generation and com-
prehensibility. The detail of the analysis detects and
captures the nature of conceptual and procedural errors
and problems in understanding this text, such as dis-
charge summaries or data gathering in EMRs [100].
This method of detecting adverse eﬀect through in-
vestigating cognitive process in comprehension equally
applies to the reasoning by lay people, such as patients.
For example, a study reported by Patel and colleagues
on errors in interpreting quantities as procedures in the
case of pharmaceutical labels addresses the case in point.
Speciﬁcally, the correct interpretation of these labels
demands that the reader translate minimal, quantitative
formulas into qualitative, and often complex, proce-
dures [102]. Given that medication errors involving the
use of therapeutic drugs are amongst the most frequent
[1], an understanding of the way in which the users of
such drugs interpret these labels when administering
therapy, is a key step in reducing errors
In this investigation of comprehension of instructions
on pharmaceutical labels by people of diverse cultural
and education backgrounds, participants were asked to
read and interpret (using think aloud methods) phar-
maceutical labels related to childrens medications of
varying complexity: (1) oral rehydration therapy (ORT);
(2) over-the-counter cough medicine; and (3) over-the-
counter fever medicine. Results show that all groups of
participants had considerable diﬃculty in interpreting
the instructions, generating errors of overdose or under-
dose. The errors of comprehension were attributed to
three features of the therapeutic situation the labels
presupposed: the uniformity of the application procedure,
the complexity of the quantiﬁed variables, and the con-
gruency with intuitive models of therapy. Uniformity of
application was violated when there are irregular inter-
vals or varying amounts of medication between doses.Complexity of quantiﬁed variables took the form of
inherently diﬃcult conversions, such as converting mil-
ligrams to milliliters, or too many calculations. Con-
gruency with intuition was violated when procedures or
their instruments must be applied in non-standard ways,
such as when the recommended frequency of adminis-
tration exceeded the readers intuitive representation of
the application situation. Instructions to the public
could be monitored knowing the basic nature of the
problems lay people have in understanding health in-
structions.
5.3. Usability inspection and usability testing
A third general cognitive method to monitor and
capture errors is related to the evaluation of human and
machine competencies as they interact. These methods
are called usability inspection and usability testing.
Kaufmans paper in this issue [103] assesses use of dia-
betic home monitoring telemedicine system by patients
in their homes. The approach incorporates a cognitive
walkthrough usability evaluation and ﬁeld usability
testing conducted in patients homes. The focus was
both on dimensions of the interface and on dimension of
patient skills and competency. The usability ﬁeld re-
search involved testing 25 patients in their homes using
the system. The analysis included a range of video-an-
alytic methods of varying levels of granularity. The us-
ability evaluation revealed aspects of the interface that
was sub optimal and may impede the performance of
certain tasks. It also found a range of patient-related
factors such as numeracy and psychomotor skills that
constitute barriers to productive use. This addresses a
serious gap in knowledge regarding the use of technol-
ogy by an elderly chronic-care patient population and
more generally, for understanding how home health
initiatives can more eﬀectively use such technology. In
another study, Patel and colleagues 99 identify the us-
ability problem in a commercially available EMR,
where the temporal sequence of events in patient data is
not captured, leading to generating diagnostic errors by
less experience physicians.
Zhang and colleagues [104] used usability heuristics
methods to evaluate the safety violations of infusion
pumps in the hospitals and also attempted to modify the
method for more accurate monitoring of adverse events.
The modiﬁed heuristic evaluation method was success-
fully applied to medical devices. 192 heuristic violations
were categorized for 89 usability problems identiﬁed for
Pump 1, and 121 heuristic violations were categorized
for the 52 usability problems identiﬁed for Pump 2.
Pump 1 had more usability problems with high severity
ratings than Pump 2. In general, Pump 1 was found to
have more usability issues that are likely to induce more
medical errors. Heuristic evaluation, when modiﬁed for
medical devices, was found to be a useful, eﬃcient, and
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medical devices through the identiﬁcation of usability
problems and their severities.6. Conclusions
Errors and adverse events can be detected in many
ways. Spontaneous reporting—the traditional corner-
stone of error and adverse event detection—can provide
some useful information, but identiﬁes only the tip of
the safety iceberg. While manual review methods have
helped to advance our understanding of adverse events,
these methods are too impractical for routine use
outside of the context of large, well-funded research
projects, with the exception of direct observation for
identiﬁcation of medication error rates. Information
technology, in contrast, has the potential to make ad-
verse event detection possible in clinical care. Costs
and person hours can be signiﬁcantly reduced. How-
ever, not all adverse events can be detected using coded
data. Improvements in techniques to extract concepts
from clinical narratives should open up novel methods
for adverse event detection. With the combination of
multiple data sources it might be possible to detect a
wide range of adverse events without reliance on
manual review. Cognitive frameworks for error-related
research will provide insight into the process of error
generation, which will not only aid in error detection,
but also more importantly inform the development of
interventions. Too often, error and adverse event de-
tection systems have not been translated into eﬀective
solutions. Increase use of cognitive and systems meth-
ods in medical error and adverse event detection sys-
tems that could result in major safety beneﬁts.
Improvements in the methods of adverse event detec-
tion will also allow researchers the means to evaluate
the nature of improvement in patient safety associated
with various interventions, which has typically been
very costly because of the infrequency of adverse
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